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Abstract
This paper undertakes a normative investigation of the quantita-
tive properties of optimal tax smoothing in a business cycle model
with state contingent debt, capital-skill complementarity, endogenous
skill formation and stochastic shocks to public consumption as well
as total factor and capital equipment productivity. Our main nding
is that an empirically relevant restriction which does not allow the
relative supply of skilled labour to adjust in response to aggregate
shocks, signicantly changes the cyclical properties of optimal labour
taxes. Under a restricted relative skill supply, the government nds
it optimal to adjust labour income tax rates so that the average net
returns to skilled and unskilled labour hours exhibit the same dynamic
behaviour as under exible skill supply.
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1 Introduction
The celebrated labour tax smoothing result of Barro (1979) in a partial equi-
librium setting has lead to a number of important studies on optimal s-
cal policy over the business cycle in representative agent general equilibrium
models. For example, Lucas and Stokey (1983) formalised labour tax smooth-
ing within a complete markets neoclassical setup without capital when the
government has access to state-contingent debt. Chari et al. (1994) gener-
alised this result in a model with capital taxation and showed that Ramsey
policy dictates that the labour income tax uctuates very little in response
to aggregate shocks and the ex ante capital income tax is approximately zero
in each period.
The literature has also examined the implications of policy frictions and
incomplete asset markets for optimal tax and debt policy, through a variety of
restrictions to the policy instrument set, government debt and capital income
taxation (see e.g. Stockman (2001), Aiyagari et al. (2002), Angeletos (2002),
Buera and Nicolini (2004) and Farhi (2010)). In contrast, assuming complete
asset markets and a complete instrument set, Arseneau and Chugh (2012)
consider labour market frictions associated with a division of the labour force
into employed and unemployed workers. Their model, with state-contingent
debt but no capital, suggests that optimal labour tax volatility depends on
whether wages are set e¢ ciently.
Another important division of the labour force is with respect to the type
of labour services workers provide and, in particular, how these complement
capital in the production process. This is especially pertinent given the
empirical relevance of the wage premium accruing to skilled labour and the
roles attributed to capital-skill complementarity, the relative supply of skilled
labour and capital augmenting technical progress (see e.g. Katz and Murphy
(1992), Krusell et al. (2000) and Hornstein et al. (2005)). In an important
contribution, which also considers non-homogenous labour, Werning (2007)
establishes the conditions under which optimal labour tax smoothing holds in
a model with redistribution under complete asset markets when workers di¤er
with respect to their productivity. However, since this research treats distinct
types of labour as perfect substitutes in production, it does not capture how
labour may exhibit di¤erent degrees of complementarity with capital as in
e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992) and Krusell et al. (2000). Moreover, since the
distribution of productivity di¤erentials is taken as given, this approach also
does not account for the endogenous determination of employment type (see
e.g. Matsuyama (2006), who also reviews the literature on job mobility).
In this paper we aim to contribute to the tax smoothing literature by
focusing on the above two features of an economy where the labour force is
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divided into skilled and unskilled workers. In particular, we examine the im-
portance of di¤erences in the complementarity between capital and skill and
unskilled labour as well as the endogenous determination of the relative skill
supply for Ramsey tax policy over the business cycle. Compared to Wern-
ing (2007), we focus on aggregate outcomes and abstract from redistribution
incentives, by following the literature that examines a division of the labour
force into two types of workers. To this end, we work with a representa-
tive household which guarantees its membersthe same level of consumption
(see e.g. Arseneau and Chugh (2012)). We thus stay as close as possible to
the representative agent Ramsey analysis of Chari et al. (1994) and extend
their model to allow for capital-skill complementarity and endogenous skill
formation.1
Our goal is thus to undertake a normative investigation of the quanti-
tative properties of optimal taxation of capital and labour income, as well
as skill-acquisition expenditure, in the presence of aggregate shocks to total
factor productivity (TFP), capital equipment productivity and government
spending. We assume complete asset markets, however, to capture the im-
portance of endogenous versus xed relative skill supply, we also consider a
labour market distortion that restricts the ratio of skilled to total workers
to remain constant. This extension is motivated by empirical evidence sug-
gesting that the share of college educated or skilled workers in the data has
low relative volatility and is e¤ectively uncorrelated with output over the
business cycle. For example, the standard deviation of the cyclical compo-
nent of this share relative to the standard deviation of output is 0.27 and its
correlation with output is -0.18.2
In our setup, the government can borrow, tax skill acquisition expen-
diture, capital, skilled and unskilled labour income separately, to nance
exogenous public spending. All policy instruments are allowed to be state-
contingent. In this environment, the optimal taxes on labour income and
skill acquisition expenditure are uniquely determined. However, as is well
known, when the government has access to both state contingent debt and
state contingent capital taxation, the second-best Ramsey allocations do not
uniquely pin down optimal debt and capital taxes (see Chari et al. (1994)).
Hence, following the literature, in this instance we discuss the properties of
the ex ante capital tax rate. Moreover, we also examine the case where debt
1Given that employment in skilled jobs is observable, we also abstract from issues
related to Mirrleesian taxation.
2These calculations are based on annual data for the share of college educated to total
working population measured in e¢ ciency units (1963-2008) from Acemoglu and Autor
(2011) and GDP data from the US NIPA accounts (1963-2008). The cyclical component
of the series is obtained using the HP-lter with a smoothing parameter of 100.
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is restricted to be state uncontingent, which allows us to calculate the ex post
capital tax or, if we also allow for state-contingent taxation of income from
bonds, the private assets tax.3
Our main nding is that under capital-skill complementarity, a friction
that does not allow the relative supply of skill to adjust in response to aggre-
gate shocks, signicantly changes the cyclical properties of optimal labour
taxes. In particular, we rst show that under endogenous relative skill sup-
ply, the optimal labour taxes for both skilled and unskilled labour income are
smooth, with the volatility of the skilled income tax being marginally lower.
We also nd that the skilled tax moves pro-cyclically with output and the
unskilled tax is mildly counter-cyclical. These results are largely consistent
with the literature and extend previous ndings to a setup with capital-skill
complementarity and endogenous skill supply.
However, when the relative skill supply is constrained to remain constant
over the business cycle, the prescriptions for optimal policy markedly change.
In particular, we nd that the volatility of taxes increases signicantly, so that
the standard deviation of the e¤ective average labour income tax is about
seven times higher than the perfect labour markets case, while the volatility of
the skilled labour income tax is about two-and-a-half times higher than that
of the unskilled labour income tax. Moreover, both taxes become strongly
counter-cyclical. We show that the key to understanding these changes is
that the government nds it optimal to minimise the e¤ects of the relative
skill supply distortion by keeping the marginal rates of substitution between
leisure and consumption for the two types of labour at roughly the same
levels as under a fully exible labour market. In other words, the government
adjusts labour income tax rates and thus alters the average net returns to
skilled and unskilled labour hours to minimise the wedge introduced by the
labour market friction.
Compared with the extension of Chari et al. (1994) undertaken by Wern-
ing (2007), our extension does not allow for redistribution. However, our
results add to the ndings in Werning (2007) in the following way. Wern-
ing (2007) shows that exogenous skill heterogeneity does not alter the basic
optimal tax smoothing result for a large class of utility functions, when the
assumption regarding the neoclassical production function is maintained and
the di¤erent skill-adjusted labour inputs are perfect substitutes in the pro-
duction function. In contrast, we analyse a case where skill-adjusted labour
inputs have di¤erent degrees of complementarity with capital and nd that
3As shown by Zhu (1992) and Chari et al. (1994), state-contingent capital income taxes
allow the government to implement the complete asset markets outcome, despite the lack
of access to state-contingent debt.
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whether this skill heterogeneity is endogenous or exogenous does indeed mat-
ter for the cyclical properties of optimal labour taxes.
Our results further show that the skill heterogeneity considered, irrespec-
tive of the presence of the labour market friction, does not a¤ect the results
obtained in the literature regarding the cyclical behaviour of asset taxes. In
particular, the ex ante tax rate on capital is around zero for every period,
the state contingent private assets and ex post capital taxes are near zero
and are the most volatile of the tax instruments. We also nd that the
skill-acquisition tax is the least smooth of the tax instruments when debt
is state-contingent and uctuates nearly as much as output. Finally, irre-
spective of the model variant examined, all of the policy instruments, except
for the ex post capital tax and the private assets tax inherit the persistence
properties of the shocks.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follow. Sections 2 and 3
present the theoretical model and the Ramsey problem respectively. Section
4 contains the quantitative results and Section 5 draws the conclusions.
2 Model
We develop a model that extends the complete markets neoclassical setup
in Zhu (1992) and Chari et al. (1994) by allowing for a division of the
labour force into skilled and unskilled workers, an endogenous skill supply
on the household side and capital-skill complementarity on the production
side. This setup implies a wage premium for skilled labour, the relative
supply of which can be increased by a cost to the household in the form of
earmarked training expenditure.4 As in Chari et al. (1994) households save
in the form of physical capital and state-contingent government bonds.
The household is modelled as an innitely-lived representative dynasty.
The head of the household makes all choices on behalf of its members by
maximising the aggregate welfare of the family, ensuring that each household
member experiences the same level of consumption irrespective of individual
labour market status. This is a commonly employed assumption since Merz
(1995), given that it allows for tractability when studying aggregate uctu-
ations under heterogeneities in the labour market (see e.g. Arseneau and
Chugh (2012) for an example with optimal tax policy).
Firms use capital, skilled and unskilled labour to produce a homogeneous
product. Following Katz and Murphy (1992), Krusell et al. (2000) and Horn-
4This is consistent with the literature on upward professional mobility, where there is
a cost associated with achieving a higher professional status (see e.g. Matsuyama (2006)
for a review of several models).
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stein et al. (2005), skilled labour is assumed to be more complementary to
capital than unskilled labour. Hence, capital accumulation as well as techno-
logical developments and government policies that are capital augmenting,
increase the skilled wage premium. In contrast, increases in the relative sup-
ply of skilled labour reduce the skill premium. Finally, the government can
borrow, tax skill acquisition expenditure, capital, skilled and unskilled labour
income separately, to nance exogenous public spending.
2.1 Notation
The notation employed throughout follows Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012).
In particular, we assume that in every period t  0, there is a realization
of shocks (stochastic events) st 2 S. Therefore, at each period t there is a
history of events st = [s0; s1; s2; :::; st] which is known. The unconditional
probability of observing a specic history of events st is dened as t (st).
For t >  , the conditional probability of having st sequence of events given
the realization of s is dened as: t (st j s ).
2.2 Households
A representative household is comprised of two types of members who provide
skilled and unskilled labour services.5 The household can invest in capital
and in state-contingent sequentially traded government bonds that mature
fully within a period. The objective function of the representative household
is given by:
1X
t=0
X
st
tt
 
st

u

ct
 
st

;  t(s
t)lst
 
st

;

1   t(st)

lut
 
st
	
(1)
where u(:) is increasing, strictly concave and three times continuously dif-
ferentiable with respect to its inputs; ct (st) is average consumption of all
household members at time t given the history of events st;6 lst (s
t) and
lut (s
t), denote, respectively, per skilled and unskilled membersleisure time;
and  t(st) is the share of skilled to total household members or the relative
skill supply. Thus  t(st)lst (s
t) and [1   t(st)] lut (st) represent average skilled
and unskilled leisure time respectively. The time constraints facing each type
5Note that the unit mass of household members is equal to the sum of its skilled and
unskilled members.
6Since consumption is the same for all members of the household, average and per
member consumption are the same.
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of member are given by:
hst
 
st

+ lst
 
st

= 1 (2)
hut
 
st

+ lut
 
st

= 1 (3)
where, hst (s
t) and hut (s
t) denote, respectively, skilled and unskilled labour
hours per member. The household can determine its relative skill supply
by incurring an average (over all its members) skill-acquisition expenditure,
et (s
t), according to the following relation:
 t(s
t) = eg et  st (4)
where eg(:) is increasing, strictly concave and three times continuously di¤er-
entiable with respect to et (st).
The household also faces a sequence of budget constraints given by:
ct (s
t) + kt+1 (s
t) +
P
st+1
pt (st+1 j st) bt+1 (st+1 j st)+
+ [1 + at (s
t)] g [ t(s
t)] = [1   st (st)]wst (st)
 t(st)hst (st) + [1  ut (st)]wut (st) [1   t(st)]hut (st)+
+ (1  ) kt (st 1) +

1   kt (st)

rt (s
t) kt (s
t 1) + bt (st j st 1) 8t
(5)
where pt (st+1 j st) is the pricing kernel for government bonds in terms of t
goods and bt+1 (st+1 j st) is the state st+1 contingent payout value of bonds
bought per member at period t;7 et (st) has been substituted out of equa-
tion (4) using the inverse function of eg dened as g [ t(st)] = et (st);  st (st) ;
ut (s
t) ;  kt (s
t) ; at (s
t) are the tax rates on skilled and unskilled labour, cap-
ital income and skill-acquisition expenditure respectively; wst (s
t) and wut (s
t)
are the wage rates of skilled and unskilled labour respectively; rt (st) is the
return to capital; kt (st 1) is the per member stock of capital at time t given
the history of events st 1; and 0 <  < 1 is the capital depreciation rate.
2.3 First order conditions for households
Substituting the constraints (2)-(3) into the utility function u(:), the house-
hold maximises the resulting objective function subject to the sequence of
constraints in (5), by choosing fct (st) ; hst (st) ; hut (st) ;  t(st); kt+1 (st) 8stg1t=0
and fbt+1 (st+1; st) ; 8stg1t=0, given initial values for b0; k0. In each time pe-
riod t and given history st, fbt+1 (st+1; st)g1t=0 is a vector of government bonds
7Given the period t state st j st 1 (or else the history st), the income side of the
household budget includes revenue from bonds dated bt
 
st j st 1

.
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with one element of the vector for each possible realisation of st+1. This yields
six rst-order conditions which are reported in Appendix A.
Combining the rst-order conditions for consumption, skilled and un-
skilled labour supply as well as the relative skill supply gives the following
atemporal equilibrium conditions:
 uhs(s
t)
uc(st)
=  t(s
t)wst
 
st
 
1   st (st)

(6)
 uhu(s
t)
uc(st)
=

1   t(st)

wut
 
st
 
1  ut (st)

(7)
 u (s
t)
uc(st)
= hst
 
st
 
1   st
 
st

wst
 
st
  (8)
  hut
 
st
 
1  ut
 
st

wut
 
st
  1 + at  st g  st .
Conditions (6)-(7) equate the marginal rates of substitution between con-
sumption and each type of labour with the average returns to skilled and
unskilled labour net of taxes. The nal relation given by (8) states that the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and the relative skill sup-
ply is equal to the net marginal benet of increasing the households share
of skilled workers. The latter includes the post-tax labour income from an
additional skilled member, hst (s
t) [1   st (st)]wst (st), less the post-tax labour
income from one less unskilled member, hut (s
t) [1  ut (st)]wut (st), less the
post-tax cost for an additional skilled member, [1 + at (s
t)] [g (s
t)].
Substituting the rst-order condition for consumption and its one-period
lead into the rst-order conditions for the two assets gives the following
intertemporal conditions equating the current cost of investing in bonds and
capital to the future state-contingent and expected benets respectively:
uc(s
t)pt
 
st+1 j st

= t+1
 
st+1 j stuc(st+1) (9)
uc(s
t) = Et

uc(s
t+1)
 
1   kt+1(st+1)

rt+1
 
st+1

+ 1  	 (10)
where
t+1(st+1)
t(st)
= t+1 (s
t+1 j st) and Et is the expectation conditional on in-
formation available at time t (i.e. history st), Etxt+1(st+1) =
P
st+1jst
t+1(st+1)
t(st)

xt+1(st+1), and the summation over st+1 denotes the sum over all possible
histories est+1 such that est = st.
By combining the intertemporal conditions we obtain:
1 =
X
st+1
pt
 
st+1 j st
 
1   kt+1
 
st+1

rt+1
 
st+1

+ (1  )	 (11)
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which ensures no-arbitrage between the investment opportunities in bonds
and capital.
2.4 Firms
Firms rent capital as well as skilled and unskilled labour from households
to maximize their prots using a production technology, F (), that exhibits
constant returns to scale in its three inputs:
t = F
h
(hs;ft (s
t); hu;ft (s
t); kft (s
t 1)
i
  (12)
  wst (st)hs;ft (st)  wut (st)hu;ft (st)  rt(st)kft (st 1).
This yields the standard rst-order conditions:
wst (s
t) = Fhs;f (s
t) (13)
wut (s
t) = Fhu;f (s
t) (14)
rt(s
t) = Fkf (s
t): (15)
2.5 Government budget and market clearing
Given a history st, the government nances an exogenous stream of expenses
get (s
t) and its debt obligation bt (st j st 1), by taxing capital and labour in-
come and skill acquisition expenditure, and by issuing state-contingent debt.
Hence, the within-period government budget constraint is given by:
get (s
t) =  s(st)wst (s
t) t(s
t)hst(s
t) + u(st)wut (s
t) [1   t(st)]
hut (st) +  kt (st)rt(st)kt(st 1) + at (st) g [ t(st)] +
+
P
st+1
pt (st+1 j st) bt+1 (st+1 j st)  bt (st j st 1).
(16)
Finally, the aggregate consistency condition and market clearing conditions
for skilled labour, unskilled labour and capital are given respectively by:
F () = ct(st) + get (st) + g

 t(s
t)

+ kt+1(s
t)  (1  ) kt(st 1) (17)
 t(s
t)hst
 
st

= hs;ft (s
t) (18)
1   t(st)

hut
 
st

= hu;ft (s
t) (19)
kt(s
t 1) = kft (s
t 1). (20)
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3 The Ramsey problem
To solve the Ramsey problem we follow the primal approach and rst de-
rive the present discounted value (PDV) of the households lifetime budget
constraint using the Arrow-Debreu price of the bond and the transversality
conditions for bonds and capital. Second, we derive the implementability con-
straint by substituting out prices and tax rates from the households present
value budget constraint using the rst-order conditions for the household and
rm. Finally, we derive the optimal Ramsey allocations by maximising the
planners objective function subject to the implementability constraint and
the aggregate resource constraint.
3.1 Present value of budget constraint
Starting from period 0 and by repeatedly substituting forward one-period
budget constraints for the household, we obtain the PDV of the households
lifetime budget constraint:
1P
t=0
P
st

t 1Q
i=0
pi (si+1 j si)

ct(s
t) =
1P
t=0
P
st

t 1Q
i=0
pi (si+1 j si)


f[(1   st (st)]wst (st) t(st)hst
 
st

+ [(1  ut (st)]wut (st)
 [1   t(st)]hut
 
st
  [1 + at (st)] g [ t(st)]g+ b0+
+

(1   k0 (s0)

r0 (s0) + (1  )
	
k0
(21)
where we have imposed the series of no-arbitrage conditions (11) 8t and the
following transversality conditions for any s1:
lim
t!1
 
t 1Y
i=0
pi
 
si+1 j si
!
kt+1
 
st

= 0 (22)
lim
t!1
X
st+1
 
t 1Y
i=0
pi
 
si+1 j si
!
pt
 
st+1 j st

bt+1
 
st+1jst

= 0 (23)
which specify that for any possible future history the household does not hold
positive or negative valued wealth at innity. Dening

t 1Q
i=0
pi (si+1 j si)


q0t (s
t), 8t  1, with q00(s0)  1, where q0t (st) is the Arrow-Debreu price, we
can re-write (21) as:
1P
t=0
P
st
q0t (s
t)ct(s
t) =
1P
t=0
P
st
q0t (s
t)f [(1   st (st)]wst (st) t(st)hst
 
st

+
+ [(1  ut (st)]wut (st) [1   t(st)]hut
 
st
  [1 + at (st)] g [ t(st)] g+
+ b0 +

(1   k0 (s0)

r0 (s0) + (1  )
	
k0. (24)
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Notice that the Arrow-Debreu price satises the recursion:
q0t+1(s
t+1) = pt
 
st+1 j st

q0t (s
t). (25)
Using the rst-order condition from the sequential equilibrium for pricing
contingent claims (9) and noting that 0 (s0) = 1, since, at period 0 the state
s0 is known, the above recursion can be written as:
q0t+1(s
t+1) = t+1t+1
 
st+1
 uc(st+1)
uc(s0)
. (26)
3.2 Implementability constraint
First, notice that (26) implies:
q0t (s
t) = tt
 
st
 uc(st)
uc(s0)
. (27)
Substituting (27) for q0t (s
t); the rst-order conditions of the rm, (13), (14)
and (15) for wst (s
t), wut (s
t) and r0, respectively; and the rst-order conditions
of the household, (6), (7), and (8) for  st (s
t), ut (s
t) and at (s
t), respectively
into the present value budget constraint (24), we obtain the implementability
constraint:8
1P
t=0
P
st
tt (s
t) [uc (s
t) ct (s
t) + uhs (s
t)hst (s
t)+
+uhu (s
t)hut (s
t) + 
t (s
t)]  A = 0
(28)
where
t (st) 
h
u (s
t)  hst (st) uhs (s
t)
 t(st)
+ hut (s
t) uhu (s
t)
1  t(st)
i
g [ t(s
t)] [g (s
t)]
 1
;
A  A(c0 (s0) ; hs0 (s0) ; hu0 (s0) ;  0(s0); b0; k0;  k0 ) = uc (s0) fb0+[(1  k0 ) eFk(s0)+
(1  )]k0g and eFk(s0) is obtained by substituting the market clearing con-
dition (20) into Fkf (s0).
3.3 Pseudo value function
Substituting the constraints (2)-(3) into the utility function u(:), the gov-
ernment maximises the resulting objective function subject to the imple-
mentability constraint (28) and the sequence of aggregate resource constraints
in (17) 8t by choosing fct (st) ; hst (st) ; hut (st) ;  t(st); kt+1 (st)8stg1t=0, given
b0; k0; 
k
0
	
:9 To achieve this, we follow Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012) and
8Note that the intertemporal rst-order condition (11) has been used already in deriving
(24), while the government budget constraint is redundant, since it is a linear combination
of the households budget constraint and the aggregate resource constraint. Therefore,
(28) and (17) summarise all the constraints that the government needs to respect.
9Note that following the literature we do not examine the problem of initial capital
taxation and thus do not allow the government to choose k0 .
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rst specify the following within-period pseudo value function:
V [ct (s
t) ; hst (s
t) ; hut (s
t) ;  t(s
t); ] = u[ct (s
t) ; 1  hst (st) ;
1  hut (st) ;  t(st)] + [uc (st) ct (st) + uhs (st)hst (st)+
+uhu (s
t)hut (s
t) + 
t (s
t)]
(29)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier with respect to the implementability
constraint.10 The Lagrangian of the Ramsey planner is dened as:
J =
1P
t=0
P
st
tt (s
t) fV (ct (st) ; hst (st) ; hut (st) ;  t(st); )+
+t (s
t) [ eF ()  ct (st)  get (st)  g [ t(st)]  kt+1(st)+
+(1  )kt(st 1)]g   A
(30)
where eF () is obtained by substituting market clearing conditions (18)-(20)
into F (); and ft (st) ; 8stg1t=0 is a sequence of Lagrange multipliers attached
to the aggregate resource constraint. For a given level of

b0; k0; 
k
0
	
, J is
maximized with respect to fct (st) ; hst (st) ; hut (st) ;  t(st); kt+1 (st) ; 8stg1t=1
and c0 (s0) ; hs0 (s
0) ; hu0 (s
0) ;  0(s
0); k1 (s
0) yielding the following rst-order
conditions respectively:
Vc
 
st

= t
 
st

; t  1 (31)
Vhs
 
st

=  t
 
st
 eFhs  st ; t  1 (32)
Vhu
 
st

=  t
 
st
 eFhu  st ; t  1 (33)
V 
 
st

= t
 
st
 
g 
 
st

; t  1 (34)
t
 
st

= Ett+1
 
st+1
 h eFk  st+1+ 1  i ; t  0 (35)
Vc
 
s0

= 0
 
s0

+ Ac (36)
Vhs
 
s0

=  0
 
s0
 eFhs  s0+ Ahs (37)
Vhu
 
s0

=  0
 
s0
 eFhu  s0+ Ahu (38)
V 
 
s0

= 0
 
s0
 
g 
 
s0

+ A . (39)
where f eFhs (st) ; eFhu (st) ; eFk (st) ; 8stg1t=0 are obtained by substituting market
clearing conditions (18)-(20) into fFhs (st) ; Fhu (st) ; Fk (st) ; 8stg1t=0 respec-
tively. The rst-order conditions derived in (31)-(39) imply that the system
of equations to be solved will be di¤erent for t = 0 and for t > 0. These
conditions in a non-stochastic environment are presented in Appendix B.
10Note that the multiplier  is non-negative and measures the disutility of future tax
distortions.
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4 Quantitative implementation
In this section we quantitatively solve both the non-stochastic and stochastic
optimal policy models. Our solution approach follows Arseneau and Chugh
(2012). In particular, we rst calibrate the non-stochastic model with ex-
ogenous policy. Next, we solve the deterministic Ramsey problem, starting
from the exogenous policy steady-state, using non-linear methods. Since we
are interested in tax smoothing over the business cycle, we then approximate
around the steady-state of the deterministic Ramsey problem to solve the
stochastic problem and obtain near steady-state dynamics.
4.1 Functional forms
Following Chari et al. (1994) and Stockman (2001), we use a CRRA utility
function:
u() =
n
[ct (s
t)]
1 1 2 [ t(st)lst (s
t)]
1 [[1   t(st)] lut (st)]2
o3
3
(40)
where, 1 and 2 are the weights to leisure in the utility function and 3 is
the relative risk aversion parameter.
The production side is given by a CES production function that allows
for capital-skill complementarity, since the latter has been shown to match
the dynamics of the skill premium in the data (see e.g. Krusell et al. (2000),
Lindquist (2004), and Pourpourides (2011)):
F () = Atf

hu;ft (s
t)

+ (41)
+ (1  )
h


Akt k
f
t (s
t)

+ (1  )

hs;ft (s
t)
i g 1
where, At is total factor productivity; Akt is the e¢ ciency level of capital
equipment;  < 1, and  < 1 are the parameters determining the factor
elasticities, i.e. 1=(1 ) is the elasticity of substitution between capital and
unskilled labour and between skilled and unskilled labour, whereas 1=(1 ) is
the elasticity of substitution between equipment capital and skilled labour;
and 0 < ;  < 1 are the factor share parameters. In this specication,
capital-skill complementarity is obtained if 1=(1  ) > 1=(1  ).
The above functional form implies that the skill premium, dened as
ws(st)
wu(st)
, can be obtained as:
ws(st)
wu(st)
=
eFhs(st)eFhu(st) = (1  ) (1  ) [ (s
t)hst(s
t)]
 1
f[1   (st)]hut (st)g 1
(t)


 1 (42)
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where t  
 
Akt (s
t)

(kt(s
t 1))

+(1  ) ( (st)hst(st)) . The restrictions
placed above on the parameters of the production function imply that the
skill premium is decreasing in  (st) and increasing in kt(st 1), see Appendix
C.
The functional form for the relative skill supply is:
eg [] = 	 et  st (43)
where 	 > 0 is the productivity of skill-acquisition; and 0   < 1 is the
elasticity of the relative skill supply with respect to skill-acquisition expen-
diture.
Finally, we calculate the e¤ective labour tax rate as the ratio of total tax
revenues from both skilled and unskilled sources as a share of total labour
income:
nt (s
t) =
st (st)wst(st) t(st)hst(st)+ut (st)wut (st)(1  t(st))hut (st)
wst (s
t) t(st)hst (s
t)+wut (s
t)(1  t(st))hut (st) :
(44)
4.2 Exogenous policy and calibration
We next present the calibration and steady-state for the exogenous policy
model. In particular, we obtain the steady-state of the following decentralised
competitive equilibrium (DCE):
Denition 1. Non-stochastic DCE with exogenous policy
Given initial levels of k0 and b0, and the ve policy instruments f st ; ut ;  kt ;
at ; g
e
t g, the non-stochastic DCE system is characterized by a sequence of
allocations fct; hst ; hut ;  t; kt+1g1t=0, prices fwst ; wut ; rt; ptg1t=0, and the residual
policy instrument fbt+1g1t=0 such that: (i) households maximise their welfare
and rms maximise their prots, taking policy and prices as given; (ii) the
government budget constraint is satised in each time period and (iii) all
markets clear. Thus, imposing the market-clearing conditions (18)-(20), the
non-stochastic DCE is comprised of the non-stochastic form of the rst-order
conditions of the household (6)-(10), the three rst-order conditions of the
rm (13)-(15), the government budget constraint (16) and the aggregate
resource constraint (17).
4.2.1 Calibration
The non-stochastic model with exogenous policy is calibrated so that its
steady-state is consistent with the annual US data for 1970-2011.
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Utility Table 1 below reports the models quantitative parameters along
with an indication of their source. Starting with the share of leisure for each
skill type in utility, 1 and 2, we calibrate these to 0:35 each so that, in the
steady-state, the household devotes about one third of its time to working.
The relative risk aversion parameter, 3 =  2 is commonly employed in
business cycle models.
Table 1: Model parameters
Parameter Value Denition Source
0 < 1< 1 0.350 weight to skilled leisure in utility calibration
0 < 2< 1 0.350 weight to unskilled leisure in utility calibration
3< 0 -2.000 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion assumption
1
1 > 0 1.669 cap. equip. to unskilled labour elasticity assumption
0 < 1
1 <
1
1  0.669 cap. equip. to skilled labour elasticity assumption
0 < 1   < 1 0.728 share of composite input to output calibration
0 <  < 1 0.518 share of cap. equip. to composite input calibration
A > 0 1.000 TFP assumption
Ak> 0 1.000 capital equipment productivity assumption
0    1 0.007 depreciation rate of capital calibration
0 <  < 1 0.960 time discount factor calibration
0   < 1 0.189 relative skill supply elasticity calibration
	 > 0 1.000 productivity of skill-acquisition assumption
 k 0.310 capital income tax rate data
u 0.200 unskilled labour tax rate data
 s 0.250 skilled labour tax rate data
n 0.220 e¤ective labour tax rate data
a 0.000 skill-acquisition expenditure tax rate assumption
ge> 0 0.047 government spending calibration
Production The elasticities of substitution between skilled labour and
capital and between unskilled labour and capital (or skilled labour) have
been estimated by Krusell et al. (2000). Following the literature (see e.g.
Lindquist (2004), and Pourpourides (2011)), we also use these estimates to
set a = 0:401 and  =  0:495. The remaining parameters in the production
function are calibrated to ensure the steady-state predictions of the model in
asset and labour markets are consistent with the data. More specically, the
labour weight in composite input share  = 0:272 is calibrated to obtain a
labour share of income of approximately equal to 70% and the capital weight
in composite input share,  = 0:518, is calibrated to obtain a skill premium
of about 1:64. Both of these targets are consistent with the U.S. data for
the period 1970-2011. The target value for the skill premium is from U.S.
14
Census data and the share of labour income in GDP is from the BEA data
on personal income.11 We also normalize the steady-state values of TFP and
capital equipment to unity (i.e. A = Ak = 1).
Depreciation and time preference The depreciation rate of capital  =
0:07 is calibrated to obtain an annual capital to output ratio of about 1:94,
which is consistent with the annual data reported by the BEA on capital
stocks.12 The time discount factor,  = 0:96, is set to obtain a post-tax
post-depreciation annual real rate of return on capital of roughly 4:17%,
which coheres with the 4:19% obtained in the data from the World Bank.13
Relative skill supply To match the share of skilled workers in total pop-
ulation,  , of roughly 44% in the data, we set the elasticity of relative skill
supply with respect to skill-acquisition, , equal to 0:2334. This share is con-
sistent with the data from the 2010 U.S. Census which indicates that 43%
of the population has a college degree.14 It also adheres with a related data
set by Acemoglu and Autor (2011) which implies that the average share of
the labour force with a college degree is approximately 45%. We normalise
skill-acquisition productivity, 	 to unity.
Tax rates and government spending Finally, we use the ECFIN e¤ec-
tive capital and labour tax rates from Martinez-Mongay (2000) to obtain an
average tax rate for capital and labour.15 Therefore, we set the tax rate for
capital income  k = 0:31 and the two labour income tax rates u = 0:20
and  s = 0:25.16 Given that it is di¢ cult to obtain data which match well
with the skill-acquisition expenditure tax rate, a, we set it to zero for the
exogenous policy model. We nally set the steady-state value ge = 0:0469,
11The data source is the Current Population Survey, 2011 Annual Social and Economic
Supplement from the U.S. Census Bureau.
12Specically, the BEA Table 1.1 on xed-assets has been used to obtain the time series
for capital stock for 1970-2011.
13The data refers to the annual real interest rate from World Bank Indicators database
for the period 1970-2011 (i.e. FR.INR.RINR).
14This information is obtained from Table 4 of the Census Bureau, Survey of Income
and Program Participation.
15In particular, we use the LITR and KITN rates for e¤ective average labour and capital
taxes respectively for 1970-2011, as they treat self-employed income as capital income in
the calculations.
16Note that the calculation of the e¤ective labour income tax rate is equal to 0.22.
But since we assume that the skilled and unskilled labour income is taxed di¤erently we
decompose the labour income tax into skilled and unskilled tax so as the weighted average
of the two tax rates equals 0.22.
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to obtain a steady-state debt to output ratio, b=Y = 53%, which is equal to
the average debt to GDP ratio obtained in the data.17
Steady-state The steady-state of the DCE dened and calibrated above
is presented in Table 2. The results indicate that the models predictions for
the great ratios match those implied by the data quite well. For example, in
the data for 1970-2011: k
y
= 1:895, c
y
= 0:640, i
y
= 0:146, g
e
y
= 0:203 and
b
y
= 0:530.18 Moreover, the share of skill acquisition expenditure in GDP, e
y
,
roughly coheres with US total expenditures for colleges and universities as a
share of output equal to 6% for 1970-2010. This data is obtained from the
U.S. National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics.
As pointed out above, the remaining steady-state variables in the exogenous
model, have been calibrated to match their values in the data.
Table 2: Steady-state of exogenous policy
c
y
k
y
i
y
e
y
b
y
ge
y
ws
wu
rnet  
0.5613 1.9444 0.1361 0.0659 0.5272 0.2367 1.6344 0.0417 0.4400
4.3 Deterministic Ramsey
The deterministic version of the Ramsey problem in (31)-(39) is summarised
in Appendix B, (B1-B16) and is solved iteratively, conditional on the calibra-
tion described in the previous section. In particular, we rst guess a value
for  and solve equations (B1-B15) for an allocation fct; hst ; hut ;  t; kt+1gTt=0.
Then we test whether equation (B16) is binding and increase or decrease the
value of  if the budget is in decit or surplus respectively.
The initial conditions for the models state variables are given by the
non-stochastic exogenous steady-state (see Table 2). For the terminal values
of the forward looking variables, we assume that after T years the dynamic
system has converged to its Ramsey steady-state. This implies that the
appropriate terminal conditions are obtained by setting the values for these
variables equal to those of the preceding period.
The nal system is given by [(15 T ) + 1] equations, which is solved
non-linearly using standard numeric methods (see, e.g. Garcia-Milà et al.
(2010), Adjemian et al. (2011), and Angelopoulos et al. (2013)). This gives
the dynamic transition path from the exogenous to the optimal steady-state.
We set T = 250 to ensure that convergence is achieved. Our results show
17The source of that time series is: FRED Economic Data on Gross Federal Debt as a
percentage of GDP, 1970-2011.
18Note that if model prediction for the cost of becoming skilled, ey = 0:0659, is added
to the cy ratio from the model, the sum is very close to the
c
y ratio in the data.
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that this occurs for all endogenous variables within 150 years.19 After we
nd the optimal allocation for fct; hst ; hut ;  t; kt+1gTt=0 we obtain wst = eFhs (t),
wut = eFhu (t) and rt = eFk (t). Additionally, we solve for  st , ut , at ,  kt and nt
using the non-stochastic form of (6), (7), (8), (10) and (44) respectively.
The Ramsey steady-state is reported in Table 3. The results are consis-
tent with the messages from the literature initiated by Chamley (1986) on dy-
namic Ramsey taxation in a deterministic environment (see e.g. Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2012), ch. 16 for a review of this literature). As expected, al-
lowing the government a complete instrument set results in a zero capital tax
rate in the long-run. Compared with the steady-state of exogenous policy, a
Ramsey government would increase capital accumulation in the steady-state,
by eliminating the intertemporal wedge. Moreover, since skilled labour is
complementing capital more than unskilled, the Ramsey government would
nd it optimal to encourage an increase in the relative skill supply, since a
higher relative quantity of skilled labour increases the returns to, and thus
the accumulation of, physical capital. This is achieved by a small subsidy to
skill acquisition expenditure. The fall in the skill premium under Ramsey
policy suggests that the increase in the relative skill supply has a relatively
stronger quantitative impact than the increase in the capital stock. The
Ramsey equilibrium also implies a mild regressivity regarding the long-run
labour income taxes, revealing an incentive to encourage the labour supply of
skilled hours, consistent with the discussion above. Finally, the government
is able to reduce the overall burden of taxation, since it can nance part of
the required public spending from accumulated assets. Note that all taxes
are reduced compared with the exogenous policy regime.
Table 3: Steady-state of optimal policy
c
y
k
y
i
y
e
y
b
y
ge
y
ws
wu
0.5610 2.6428 0.1850 0.0731 -2.4599 0.1809 1.4950
 s u n  k a rnet  
0.1188 0.1260 0.1208 0.0000 -0.0353 0.0417 0.4721
We next study the transition dynamics associated with Ramsey policy.
Figure 1 illustrates the dynamic paths implied by optimal policy for the cap-
ital tax, the two labour taxes, the skill-acquisition expenditure tax and debt
to output as the economy evolves from the exogenous steady-state to the
Ramsey steady-state. The rst panel of Figure 1 shows that in period 1
skilled and unskilled labour are subsidised at rates of 16% and 14.57% re-
spectively; and skill-acquisition expenditure is taxed at a rate of 26.76%. In
19See Figure 1 below for an illustration of convergence using the policy instruments.
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period 2, skilled and unskilled labour taxes are 15.24% and 14.36% respec-
tively and eventually converge to their steady-state values reported in Table
3. Also in period 2, skill-acquisition is subsidised at a rate of 2.11% and
converges to 3.53% in the steady-state. The second panel of Figure 1 shows
that in period 1, since capital already in place, capital income is taxed at
a conscatory rate (approximately 210%). In period 2, the capital income
tax is 0.27% and then converges slowly to zero. The high capital taxation in
the rst period allows the government to create a rst period stock of assets
of approximately the size of GDP, by lending to the household. Govern-
ment assets increase in future periods and their income is used to subsidise
skill-acquisition expenditure and to compensate for the losses from foregone
capital income taxation, without the need to resort to high labour income
taxes. These transition paths are consistent with previous research.
[Figure 1]
4.4 Stochastic processes
To move to the analysis of the stochastic Ramsey problem, we need to dene
the stochastic processes that drive economic uctuations. In what follows we
designate a stochastic state st at time t that determines exogenous shocks to
both the rms production technologies, (At, Akt ), and to government expen-
ditures (get ). Therefore, the optimal allocation of households will depend on
the history of events st at time t. Following the literature, At, Akt and g
e
t are
assumed to follow stochastic AR(1) processes:
At+1 = (1  A)A+ AAt + "At+1 (45)
Akt+1 = (1  Ak)Ak + AkAkt + "Akt+1 (46)
get+1 = (1  ge) ge + geget + "g
e
t+1 (47)
where "At , "
Ak
t and "
ge
t are independently and identically distributed Gaussian
random variables with zero means and standard deviations given respectively
by A, Ak and ge.
The values for the AR(1) coe¢ cients and the standard deviations for the
government expenditures and capital productivity exogenous processes are
data based and are estimated to be: Ak = 0:90, ge = 0:70, Ak = 0:007
and g = 0:012.20 The autocorrelation parameter of TFP is set equal to 0:95,
following Lindquist (2004) and Pourpourides (2011), while A is calibrated to
20The government spending series refers to government consumption expenditures and
gross investment from NIPA Table 1.1.5 (1970-2011). The capital series refers to produc-
tive capital stock and is from the Bureau of Labour Statistics Table 4.1 (1988-2011). Note
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match the volatility of output observed in the BEA data.21 More specically,
the standard deviation for TFP is set A = 0:8% to obtain a volatility for
output from 1970-2011 equal to 1:2%.
Table 4: Parameters for stochastic processes
Parameter Value Denition Source
A 0.008 standard deviation of TFP calibration
A 0.950 AR(1) coe¢ cient of TFP data
Ak 0.007 standard deviation of capital equipment data
Ak 0.900 AR(1) coe¢ cient of capital equipment data
ge 0.012 standard deviation of public spending data
ge 0.700 AR(1) coe¢ cient of public spending data
4.5 Stochastic Ramsey
We next approximate the dynamic equilibrium paths due to three exogenous
shocks using rst-order accurate decision rules of the equilibrium conditions
under optimal policy in (31)-(35), around the optimal deterministic steady-
state of these conditions described above.22 As is common in the literature
when characterizing policy dynamics, we also make the auxiliary assumption
that the initial state of the economy at t = 0 is the steady-state under optimal
policy.
As is well known (see e.g. Zhu (1992), Chari et al. (1994) and Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2012)), the Ramsey problem with state-contingent debt cannot
uniquely pin down the capital tax rate. Hence, we follow the literature and
calculate the optimal ex-ante capital income tax rate (see Appendix D for
details):
 kt+1(s
t) =
Etuc(s
t+1)
h eFk(st+1) + 1  i  uc(st)
Etuc(st+1) eFk(st+1) : (48)
Alternatively, by assuming that government debt is not state-contingent, we
can calculate the ex post state contingent capital tax (see Appendix E for
that there is no data available prior to 1988 for the productivity of capital. To calculate
the statistical properties of the cyclical component of the series, we take logs and apply
the HP-lter with smoothing parameter equal to 6.25.
21The time series for GDP from 1970-2011 is obtained from NIPA Table 1.1.5. Cyclical
output is again calculated using the HP-lter as above.
22We use the perturbation methods in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) to solve the
dynamic model.
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the derivation):
e kt (st) =  1rt(st)kt(st 1) fgt(st)  at (st) g [ t(st)]  bt+1(st)Rt(st) + bt (st 1) 
   s(st)wst (st) t
 
st

hst(s
t)  u(st)wut (st)

1   t
 
st

)

hut (s
t)g (49)
where Rt (st) is the state uncontingent or the risk free return to holding
government debt. Alternatively, assuming the government employs a state-
contingent tax on income from government bonds, we can calculate the pri-
vate assets tax,  (st+1jst) that applies to taxing jointly the income from
assets as (see Appendix E for the derivation):
t (s
t+1jst)=

1
Fk(st+1)kt+1(st)+bt+1(st)

 fgt+1(st+1) + bt+1 (st)  bt+2(s
t+1)
Rt+1(st+1)
 
  s(st+1)wst+1(st+1) t+1 (st+1)hst+1(st+1)  u(st+1)wut+1(st+1)
 1   t+1  st+1hut+1(st+1)  at+1  st+1 g  t+1(st+1)g. (50)
To calculate the business cycle statistics of the relevant quantities of the
model under optimal policy, we conduct simulations by shocking all of the
exogenous processes, obtain the required moments for each simulation and
then calculate their mean value across the simulations. We undertake 1000
simulations, each 242 periods long and drop the rst 200 periods to ensure
that the initial conditions do not a¤ect the results. We retain 42 periods in
our analysis to match the number of years between 1970 and 2011 used in
the calibration.
4.6 Cyclical properties
We next present the results regarding the key second moments of the sto-
chastic optimal policy problem. We conduct this analysis for both the model
developed above and the model where the relative skill supply is exogenously
determined over the business cycle. This is followed by an impulse response
analysis, which allows to investigate the channels through which tax policy
works over the business cycle.
4.6.1 Endogenous relative skill supply
We start with the cyclical properties of Ramsey taxation under endogenous
relative skill supply. The results on standard deviations and correlations with
output, for the endogenous variables of the model as well as the various tax
rates that were explained above are summarised in the rst three columns of
Table 5. The results regarding optimal taxation are largely consistent with
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the literature and thus extend previous ndings to a setup with capital-skill
complementarity and endogenous skill supply.
Table 5: Stochastic results
endogenous  exogenous  
xi xi xi  (xi; y) xi xi  (xi; y)
y 0.2590 0.0229 1 0.2590 0.0211 1
c 0.1452 0.0251 0.9784 0.1452 0.0253 0.9785
k 0.6842 0.0202 0.6070 0.6843 0.0183 0.5958
hs 0.4090 0.0021 0.4780 0.4090 0.0017 0.2332
hu 0.2033 0.0093 -0.5381 0.2033 0.0088 -0.5497
 0.4721 0.0034 0.9582 0.4721 0.0000 0.0000
ws
wu
1.4952 0.0040 -0.9728 1.4948 0.0023 0.4509
 s 0.1188 0.0012 0.5158 0.1188 0.0073 -0.9008
u 0.1260 0.0014 -0.2750 0.1261 0.0029 -0.8676
 (1   s)ws 0.2867 0.0257 0.9838 0.2867 0.0255 0.9828
(1   )(1  u)wu 0.2127 0.0233 0.9894 0.2127 0.0236 0.9889
n 0.1208 0.0009 0.2474 0.1208 0.0061 -0.9046
a -0.0354 0.0171 0.3053 -0.0354 0.0000 0.0000
 k -8.3e-6 0.0004 0.5983 -1.4e-5 0.0004 0.6325e k 0.0137 0.1291 -0.2087 0.0148 0.1345 -0.2271
 -0.0020 0.0175 0.2092 -0.0022 0.0184 0.2279
In particular, the ex ante tax rate on capital is e¤ectively zero and is
around zero for every period. Moreover, when debt is not allowed to be
state-contingent, the state contingent private assets and ex post capital taxes
are near zero, have low correlations with output and are the most volatile of
the tax instruments. These results are similar to ndings in the literature to
date. Also consistent with the labour tax-smoothing results in the literature,
both labour taxes have very low standard deviations relative to output, as
the government nds it optimal to minimise the distortions introduced by
labour taxes over the business cycle by keeping them relatively smooth and
letting the remaining state-contingent policy instruments respond to exoge-
nous shocks. However, they exhibit di¤erent correlations with output. The
tax rate on skilled labour income is pro-cyclical, whereas the tax rate on
unskilled labour income is mildly counter-cyclical. The skill-acquisition tax
is the least smooth of the tax instruments when debt is state-contingent and
uctuates nearly as much as output. Moreover, it is mildly pro-cyclical.
Finally, the labour income taxes and the ex ante capital income tax in this
model inherit the properties of the exogenous processes. As can be seen in
Table 6, the autocorrelations of these instruments follow the autocorrelations
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of the exogenous processes, so that when shocks are autocorrelated as in
Table 4, so are the tax rates. However, if we assume that the shocks follow
iid processes, the autocorrelation of the tax rates generally becomes very
small. On the contrary, the autocorrelations of the ex post capital tax and
of the private assets tax do not follow the autocorrelations of the exogenous
processes. This is again similar to previous ndings.
Table 6: Autocorrelations
autocorrelated shocks iidshocks
endogenous  exogenous  endogenous  exogenous  
 s 0.7714 0.9101 -0.0431 -0.0262
u 0.9116 0.9403 -0.0487 0.3212
n 0.7660 0.9182 -0.0637 -0.0026
a 0.8304 1.0000 0.0570 1.0000
 k 0.7402 0.7429 -0.0435 -0.0398e k -0.1602 -0.1596 -0.5009 -0.4985
 -0.1731 -0.1711 -0.5016 -0.4982
4.6.2 Exogenous relative skill supply
We next examine how the prescriptions for optimal policy are a¤ected by a
friction in the labour market that does not permit changes in the relative
skill supply over the business cycle. As discussed in the introduction, this
restriction is empirically relevant.23 To analyse the e¤ects of a xed rela-
tive skill supply over the business cycle, we obtain the rst-order conditions
for optimal policy incorporating this rigidity and then approximate these
conditions around the Ramsey deterministic steady-state with endogenous
 t (s
t) in Table 3. The latter avoids approximating around the steady-state
in which the relative skill supply is restricted over both the short- and long-
run. Thus, we set  t (st), for each possible history st, to be equal to the
steady-state value from the deterministic Ramsey problem with endogenous
 t (s
t) in Table 3. This also means that skill-acquisition expenditure et (st)
and the respective tax rate at (s
t) are also set to their respective values in
Table 3.24 The results pertaining to the business cycle properties of the econ-
23Note that the model with an endogenously chosen relative skill supply does not capture
this feature. In particular, when the model is simulated under the exogenous processes
in Section 4.4, it produces an HP ltered series for  t (st), which has a correlation with
similarly detrended output of about 60% and a relative-to-output standard deviation of
around 50%.
24Note we keep at (s
t) constant when skill-acquisition expenditure remains constant,
since there is no margin in the household decision for at (s
t) to a¤ect. Hence, it is equiv-
alent to a lump-sum tax, the optimal choice of which is ruled out in Ramsey second-best
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omy under optimal policy in this case are presented in the last three columns
of Table 5.
These results rst suggest that the properties of asset taxation do not
change. However, there are important di¤erences regarding labour income
taxation. In particular, the two labour income taxes become quantitatively
more volatile, so that the e¤ective labour income tax rate, nt (s
t), is about
seven times more volatile. Also note that the labour tax volatility increases
asymmetrically, so that  st (s
t) is about two-and-a-half times more volatile
than ut (s
t). Finally, both labour taxes become strongly counter-cyclical.
Thus, under capital-skill complementarity, imposing the restriction that the
relative skill supply does not change over the business cycle has important
implications for the business cycle properties of labour income taxation.
4.6.3 Labour market wedges
The key to understanding these changes is to note that the rigidity of  t (st)
over the business cycle creates a distortion in the labour markets that is re-
ected in the di¤erence between the atemporal rst-order conditions of the
household given by (6)-(7) and the corresponding conditions when the rel-
ative skill supply is xed,  . This distortion drives a wedge between the
average net returns to labour supply in the perfect and imperfect labour
markets, or, alternatively, a wedge between the marginal rates of substitu-
tion between leisure and consumption in the perfect and imperfect labour
markets. Thus these wedges for skilled and unskilled workers respectively
can be dened as follows:
lwst
 
st

=

1   st
 
st

 t
 
st

wst
 
st
  1  b st  st bwst  st (51)
lwut
 
st

=

1  ut
 
st
 
1   t
 
st

wut
 
st
  1  but  st  1    bwut  st
where hatted variables denote the case when the relative skill supply is xed.
Given that in both models considered here (i.e. with exible and rigid
relative skill supply) it is assumed that the government needs to resort to
distortionary taxation so that the rst-best cannot be achieved in either
case. Hence, the best that the government can do is to achieve the second-
best allocations in the labour markets represented by Ramsey taxation under
exible relative skill supply in (6) and (7). This is reected in the denition
of the labour wedges created by the rigidity in the relative skill supply in
(51).
Our results make clear that the government wishes to minimise these
wedges over the business cycle and this is achieved by setting b st (st) and
analysis.
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but (st) so that paths for the skilled and unskilled average net return under
the market distortion are as close as possible to the paths of the correspond-
ing quantities without the market distortion. Table 5 clearly shows that sec-
ond moments of these returns are very similar and this is further conrmed
when we examine the impulse responses below. In contrast, the intertem-
poral margins are not directly a¤ected by the rigidity in the relative skill
supply. Hence, the optimal policies regarding asset taxation are not qualita-
tively di¤erent between the two models. Finally, the results relating to the
autocorrelation properties of the instruments generally follow the same pat-
tern as when the relative skill supply is endogenous. The natural exception
here is for the autocorrelation properties of a, which is constant when  is
exogenous since skill acquisition expenditure is constant. Thus a has a unit
AR(1) parameter for both the autocorrelated and iid cases.
4.6.4 Impulse responses
To further explain the previous results and examine the optimal response
of taxation to changes in exogenous productivity and government spending,
we plot the impulse responses of key endogenous variables after a temporary
1% shock to the exogenous distributions in "At , "
Ak
t and "
ge
t . These plots are
shown in Figures 2-4 below.
[Figures 2-4]
After a positive TFP or capital equipment shock (see Figures 2 and 3),
the capital stock, kt, increases, since the productivity of capital increases. As
shown earlier (see Appendix C), this tends to increase the returns to skilled
hours more than the return to unskilled, given capital-skill complementarity.
In the exible labour markets model, the increase in the returns to skilled
labour also leads to an increase in the relative supply of skill,  t, which,
other things equal, tends to decrease the skill premium (see Appendix C).
These two forces, on balance, lead to a fall in the skill premium, w
s
t
wut
, shown
in the Figures. The government nds it optimal to respond to these shocks
by keeping the labour income taxes ( st and 
u
t ) relatively smooth, consis-
tent with the tax smoothing literature. Optimal policy also encourages the
accumulation of skill by decreasing at .
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Under the relative skill supply restriction, the increase in the capital stock
cannot be followed by an increase in  t (see again Figures 2 and 3). Therefore,
25However, note that the smoothness of the labour income taxes is not due to the skill-
acquisition subsidy, since a version of the model where at (s
t) is xed over the business
cycle provides very similar second moments and impulse responses. These results are not
presented here to save on space but are available on request.
24
the returns to skilled and unskilled labour, wst and w
u
t , respectively, now fol-
low di¤erent paths, summarised by the increase in the skill premium. Ceteris
paribus, this drives a wedge between the average net returns to skilled and
unskilled labour hours under the restricted model, relative to those from the
exible labour markets model. To minimise the e¤ects of the relative labour
supply distortion, the government adjusts the optimal response of the labour
income taxes, as can be seen in the plots for these returns. It achieves this by
by keeping the marginal rates of substitution between leisure and consump-
tion for the two types of labour at roughly the same levels as under a fully
exible labour market. Indeed, the response becomes more counter-cyclical,
to smooth the response of average net returns to skilled and unskilled labour,
so that these last two quantities exhibit, post shock, e¤ectively identical re-
sponses with their corresponding quantities in the exible labour market.
Note also that the change in  st is larger than 
u
t , since, given capital-skill
complementarity, wst is a¤ected more by the increase in the capital stock than
wut . Thus a larger adjustment in policy is required.
A temporary reduction in government spending in Figure 4, does not have
direct productivity e¤ects in these models. However, it allows the govern-
ment to briey reduce the tax burden on labour income and thus encourage
labour supply. In the model with endogenous relative skill supply, a small re-
duction in  st increases the average net return to skilled labour both directly
and indirectly, via the induced increase in  t. The latter happens because
the increase in skilled labour raises the return to capital as well and thus
the returns to investing into skill-acquisition. On the contrary, under the
restricted relative skill supply assumption, the indirect e¤ect is missing and
thus  st needs to be increased by more, to maintain the same average net
return to skilled labour hours. The unskilled labour supply does not a¤ect
capital accumulation as much (given capital-skill complementarity). Hence
it does not need to be changed by as much under endogenous relative skill
supply. In turn, this implies that no big changes are required in the opti-
mal response to ut when relative skill supply is xed, to maintain the same
average net return to unskilled labour hours.
5 Conclusions
Motivated by the empirical relevance of the wage-skill premium and the roles
played by capital-skill complementarity, the relative supply of skilled labour
and capital augmenting technical change, this paper contributed to the tax
smoothing literature by undertaking a normative investigation of the quan-
titative properties of optimal taxation of capital and labour income, as well
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as skill-acquisition expenditure, in the presence of aggregate shocks to total
factor productivity (TFP), capital equipment productivity and government
spending.
Our main nding was that under capital-skill complementarity, a friction
that did not allow the relative supply of skill to adjust in response to aggre-
gate shocks, signicantly changed the cyclical properties of optimal labour
taxes. In particular, we rst showed that under endogenous relative skill sup-
ply, the optimal labour taxes for both skilled and unskilled labour income
were smooth, with the volatility of the skilled income tax being marginally
lower. We also found that the skilled tax moves pro-cyclically with output
and the unskilled tax was mildly counter-cyclical. These results were largely
consistent with the literature and extended previous ndings to a setup with
capital-skill complementarity and endogenous skill supply.
We also found that, when the relative skill supply was constrained to
remain constant over the business cycle, the prescriptions for optimal pol-
icy markedly changed. In particular, we found that the volatility of taxes
increased signicantly, so that the standard deviation of the e¤ective aver-
age labour income tax was about seven times higher than the perfect labour
markets case, while the volatility of the skilled labour income tax was about
two-and-a-half times higher than that of the unskilled labour income tax.
Moreover, both taxes became strongly counter-cyclical. We further demon-
strated that the key to explaining these changes was that the government
found it optimal to adjust labour income tax rates to alter the average net
returns to skilled and unskilled labour hours, so that their dynamic behaviour
under restricted skill supply is the same as under exible skill supply.
Our results additionally revealed that the skill heterogeneity considered,
irrespective of the presence of the labour market friction, did not a¤ect the re-
sults obtained in the literature regarding the cyclical behaviour of asset taxes.
In particular, the ex ante tax rate on capital was around zero for every pe-
riod, the state contingent private assets and ex post capital taxes were near
zero and are the most volatile of the tax instruments. We also found that the
skill-acquisition tax was the least smooth of the tax instruments when debt
was state-contingent and uctuated nearly as much as output. Finally, irre-
spective of the model variant examined, all of the policy instruments, except
the ex post capital tax and the private assets tax inherited the persistence
properties of the shocks.
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Appendix A: Households rst-order conditions
The households rst-order conditions for consumption, skilled labour supply,
unskilled labour supply, debt, capital and the relative skill supply are given
respectively by the following relations:
uc(s
t) = t
 
st

(A1)
uhs(s
t) =  t(st) t(st)

1   st (st)

wst
 
st
	
(A2)
uhu(s
t) =  t(st)

1   t(st)
 
1  ut (st)

wut
 
st

(A3)
t
 
st

t(s
t)pt
 
st+1 j st

= t+1
 
st+1

t+1(s
t+1) (A4)
t (s
t)t(s
t) = 
P
st+1
ft+1 (st+1)t+1(st+1)
 rt+1 (st+1) 1   kt+1 (st+1)+ (1  )g (A5)
u (s
t) =  t(st)fhst (st) [1   st (st)]wst (st)  hut (st)
 1  ut  stwut  st  1 + at  st g  stg: (A6)
Appendix B: Deterministic Ramsey system
In a non-stochastic environment, the rst-order conditions derived in (31)-
(39) of the main text become:
 for t = 0:
Vhs (0) =   [Vc (0)  Ac] eFhs (0) + Ahs (B1)
Vhu (0) =   [Vc (0)  Ac] eFhu (0) + Ahu (B2)
V (0) = [Vc (0)  Ac] [g (0)] + A (B3)
Vc (0) = Vc (1)
h eFk (1) + 1  i+ Ac (B4)eF [ (0)] = c0 + ge + g ( 0) + k1   (1  )k0 (B5)
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 for t = 1; 2; 3:::T   1:
Vhs (t) =  Vc (t) eFhs (t) (B6)
Vhu (t) =  Vc (t) eFhu (t) (B7)
V (t) = Vc (t) [g (t)] (B8)
Vc (t) = Vc (t+ 1)
h eFk (t+ 1) + 1  i (B9)eF [ (t)] = ct + ge + g ( t) + kt+1   (1  )kt (B10)
 for t = T :
Vhs (T ) =  Vc (T ) eFhs (T ) (B11)
Vhu (T ) =  Vc (T ) eFhu (T ) (B12)
V (T ) = Vc (T ) [g (T )] (B13)
1 = 
h eFk (T ) + 1  i (B14)eF [ (T )] = cT + ge + g ( T ) + kT+1   (1  )kT (B15)
 lifetime implementability constraint:
TX
t=0
t[uc (t) ct + uhsh
s
t + uhuh
u
t + 
t] A = 0 (B16)
where A = uc (0)
n
b0 +
h
(1   k0 ) eFk (0) + (1  )i k0o, the Lagrange multi-
plier t has been replaced with Vc (t) using (31) and (36) in the main text
and the notation X (t) denotes the time period t quantity of X.
Appendix C: The e¤ects of kt and  t on the skill premium
Di¤erentiating the skill premium, given by (42) in the main text,with respect
to kt we have (note that we do not use the st notation to keep the presentation
more parsimonious):
@

wst
wut

@kt
= fAkt 
 
Akt kt
 1
( th
s
t)
 1 (1  ) ( thst) +   Akt kt a 2
 ((1   t)hut )1  (1  ) (1  )
a

  1

g  
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This is positive if a > ; a;  < 1; 0 < ;  < 1.
Di¤erentiating (42) with respect to  t gives:
@

wst
wut

@ t
=  hut ( thst) (1  ) (1  )

(1  ) ( thst) + 
 
Akt kt
 a 2


( th
s
t)
 [(1  ) (1  a)] +
+
 
Akt kt

[(1  ) +  t (   a)]


 hst 2t ((1   t)hut )
This expression is negative if [(1  ) +  t (   a)] > 0 or 1   >  t, which
is true because 1 
  > 1, since 1 > ) 1   >    and 0 <  t < 1.
Appendix D: Ex ante capital tax
Assume that the government uses a capital tax that is not state-contingent,
so that its value for period t + 1 is decided using the history st. Dene
this uncontingent tax as  kt+1(s
t) and note that it needs to satisfy the Euler-
equation from (10) in the main text, so that the Ramsey allocations are
preserved:
uc(s
t) = Et
n
uc(s
t+1)
h eFk(st+1) 1   kt+1(st+1)+ 1  io (C1)
where we have used eFk(st+1) = rt+1(st+1). Hence,  kt+1(st) needs to satisfy:
uc(s
t) = Et
n
uc(s
t+1)
h eFk(st+1) 1   kt+1(st)+ 1  io . (C2)
By comparing (C2) with (C1), we see that  kt+1(s
t) needs to satisfy:
Et
n
uc(s
t+1)
h eFk(st+1) 1   kt+1(st)+ 1  io = (C3)
= Et
n
uc(s
t+1)
h eFk(st+1) 1   kt+1(st+1)+ 1  io
implying that:
 kt+1(s
t) =
Etuc(s
t+1)
h
 kt+1(s
t+1) eFk(st+1)i
Etuc(st+1) eFk(st+1) : (C4)
This gives  kt+1(s
t) the ex ante capital tax interpretation, since, by multi-
plying both numerator and denominator in (C4) by kt+1(st), this expression
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provides the expected tax revenue from capital income as share of the ex-
pected capital income, where the expectation is calculated using information
at period t.
To obtain the ex ante rate stated in equation (48) of the main text, we
rst expand the Euler-equation (C1):
uc(s
t) = Etuc(s
t+1) eFk(st+1)  Etuc(st+1) kt+1(st+1) eFk(st+1)+ (C5)
+ Etuc(s
t+1) (1  )
and note thatEtuc(st+1) kt+1(s
t+1) eFk(st+1) in (C5) equals  kt+1(st)Etuc(st+1)
 eFk(st+1), using (C4). Substituting this expression back into (C5) we obtain:
uc(s
t) = Etuc(s
t+1) eFk(st+1)   kt+1(st)Etuc(st+1) eFk(st+1)+ (C6)
+ Etuc(s
t+1) (1  ) :
Finally solving (C6) for  kt+1(s
t) gives the ex ante capital tax rate reported
in equation (48) of the main text.
Appendix E: Uncontingent debt
Ex-post capital tax
The treatment of state-uncontingent debt and presentation follows Chari et
al. (1994) and Ljungvist and Sargent (2012, ch. 16). Assume that the
government issues uncontingent debt, bt+1 (st) which has a risk-free return
Rt (s
t). The budget constraint of the government in period t is written as:
gt(s
t) =  s(st)wst (s
t) t
 
st

hst(s
t) + u(st)wut (s
t)

1   t
 
st

hut (s
t)+
+at (s
t) g [ t(s
t)] +  kt (s
t)rt(s
t)kt(s
t 1) +
bt+1(st)
Rt(st)
  bt (st 1). (D1)
The budget constraint of the household in period t is given by:
ct (s
t)+kt+1 (s
t)+
bt+1(st)
_
Rt(st)
+ [1 + at (s
t)] g [ t(s
t)] = (1   st (st) )
 wst
 
st

 t
 
st

hst
 
st

+

1  ut
 
st

wut
 
st
 
1   t
 
st

hut
 
st

+
+(1  ) kt
 
st 1

+

1   kt
 
st

rt
 
st

kt
 
st 1

+bt
 
st 1

(D2)
which implies that the rst-order condition with respect to holding bonds is
given by:
1
Rt (st)
= Et
uc(s
t+1)
uc(st)
. (D3)
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Note that the right-hand side of (A4) needs to be the same as the right-hand
side of the rst-order condition with respect to bonds in the case of state-
contingent debt, so that the implied allocations from the two problems (i.e.
with and without state-contingent debt) are the same. In turn, this implies
that the risk-free (or uncontingent) return needs to satisfy:
1
Rt (st)
=
X
st+1 pst
pt
 
st+1 j st

. (D4)
To obtain an expression for br+1 (sr) for a given period r, we work as
follows. We multiply the budget constraint of the household in (D2) for pe-
riods r and r + 1 by r (sr) and r+1 (sr+1) respectively, sum the resulting
budget constraint in r + 1 over all possible realisations sr+1 and add it to
the budget constraint in period r. We then use the rst-order conditions of
the household to simplify the expression and continue this forward iterative
process until time period T !1. By imposing the appropriate transversal-
ity conditions we obtain an expression for br+1 (sr) as a function of identied
equilibrium paths given in:
br+1 (s
r)=
_
Rr (s
r)
1P
t=r+1
P
st
t rt(st)[uc(st)ct(st)+uhs (st)hst(st)+uhu (st)hut (st)+
t(st)]
r(sr)uc(sr)
 
 
_
Rr (s
r) kr+1 (s
r) (D5)
where, 
t (st) is dened in the main text under equation (28). Hence we can
use (D3) to obtain Rt (st), (D5) to nd bt+1 (st) and nally (D1) to calculate
the ex-post capital tax reported in equation (49) of the main text.
Private assets tax
Assume that the government issues uncontingent debt, bt+1 (st), which has
a risk-free return Rt (st), satisfying (D4), but which is taxed using a state-
contingent tax t+1 (st+1). The budget constraint of the government is now
written as:
gt(s
t) =  s(st)wst (s
t) t
 
st

hst(s
t) + u(st)wut (s
t)

1   t
 
st

hut (s
t)+
+ at
 
st

g

 t(s
t)

+  kt (s
t)rt(s
t)kt(s
t 1)+ (D6)
+
bt+1 (s
t)
Rt (st)
  1  t  st bt  st 1
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while the budget constraint of the household becomes:
ct (s
t) + kt+1 (s
t) +
bt+1(st)
Rt(st)
+ [1 + at (s
t)] g [ t(s
t)] =
= [1   st (st)]wst (st) t (st)hst (st) + [1  ut (st)]wut (st)
 [1   t (st)]hut (st) + (1  ) kt (st 1) +

1   kt (st)

rt (s
t)
kt (st 1) + [1  t (st)] bt (st 1)
(D7)
which implies that the rst-order condition with respect to holding bonds
becomes:
1
Rt (st)
=
X
st+1 pst
t+1
 
st+1 p st
 uc(st+1)
uc(st)

1  t+1
 
st+1

. (D8)
The introduction of the new assets tax has to be such that the equilibrium
allocations obtained without it are respected. Hence the asset tax must be
such that makes the right-hand side of (A4) and (D8) equal. Hence, the asset
tax must satisfy:
Etuc(s
t+1)t+1
 
st+1

= 0 (D9)
which implies that at time period t, the expected value of the asset tax in
period t + 1, valued in terms of utility, has to be equal to zero. Therefore,
(D9) implies that Rt (st) in this case is given by (D3) as well. Moreover,
to obtain (D5), we substitute household budget constraints in (D7) forward,
using the household rst-order conditions, the transversality conditions, the
restriction in (D9) and the restriction that the asset tax in the initial period
under consideration is zero. Note that this restriction is equivalent to making
the zero capital tax assumption in the initial period.
The private assets tax is dened as the tax revenue from assets over
income from assets. In particular:
t
 
st+1jst =  kt+1(st+1)Fk(st+1)kt+1(st) + t+1 (st+1) bt+1 (st)
Fk(st+1)kt+1(st) + bt+1 (st)
. (D10)
Solving (D6) for t (st) bt (st 1) and substituting this into (D10) we have the
expression for t (st+1jst) reported in equation (50) of the main text.
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Figure 1: Transition paths of the policy instruments
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to 1% temporary shock to TFP
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to 1% temporary shock to capital equipment productivity
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to 1% temporary shock to goverment spending
